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Counterfactual Thinking as a Scientific Method 
Roland Wenzlhuemer ∗ 
Abstract: »Kontrafaktisches Denken als wissenschaftliche Methode«. Despite 
their alleged uselessness, we frequently encounter instances of counterfactual 
thinking in everyday-life situations. During the last two decades, psychologists 
have examined this phenomenon and have been able to show that counterfac-
tual thoughts about past (and, therefore, unchangeable) events can be useful for 
the thinker. This article retraces the effects of counterfactual thinking in every-
day life and seeks to translate them into an academic context. Can counterfac-
tuals produce similar analytical benefits in the sciences? And if so, what ex-
actly are those benefits? After briefly examining the psychological aspects of 
counterfactual thinking, the article discusses its potential uses from a general 
scientific perspective before using counterfactual history as a concrete exam-
ple. Eventually and for good measure, attention is drawn to the clear and pre-
sent dangers associated with counterfactual thinking in an academic context. 
Keywords: counterfactual thinking, counterfactual history, contrast effect, 
hindsight bias, self-protective bias. 
Introduction – The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking 
If ‘ifs’ and ‘ands’ were pots and pans, there’d be no work for tink-
ers.” – “Wenn das Wörtchen ‘wenn’ nicht wär’...” – “Avec des ‘si’ 
et des ‘mais’, on mettrait Paris dans une bouteille.” – “Če čebula ne 
bi imela če, bi bila bula. (Popular Wisdoms in English, German, 
French and Czech). 
On 20 August 2008 Spanair Flight JK 5022 crashed at Madrid Airport immedi-
ately after take-off. More than 150 people died in the crash and the subsequent 
fire. In the following days, media coverage was extensive. Experts seemed 
puzzled by the accident and offered a host of different explanations. Soon there 
were allegations that the crew had kept anxious passengers from getting off the 
plane after an aborted departure. Relatives of the casualties raised all sorts of 
accusations and demanded justice. And yet within all this tragedy and chaos, 
among the most impressive and unforgettable pictures were those of the couple 
who had arrived three minutes too late at check-in and had not been allowed on 
the plane anymore. Interviewed by Spanish television, they were both in a state 
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of severe shock. She has not been able to say much at all, he briefly stated that 
they were grateful and would celebrate a second birthday. 
This tragic and unfortunately non-fictional event provides one of the classic 
“what if” scenarios. The couple had been determined to take the flight and only 
some unforeseen coincidence, mere chance, saved them from a potentially fatal 
disaster by minutes. It is absolutely reasonable to assume that the lucky couple 
will for a long time be haunted by questions starting with “what if” or “what 
might have been”. Two factors are likely to trigger such thoughts in this par-
ticular case: the magnitude of what was at stake and the closeness of the alter-
native. While even in this extreme example there seems to be no practical use 
in thinking about alternative outcomes and potential fatalities, the closeness of 
the event – i.e. the extraordinarily narrow escape by sheer chance – practically 
forces such thoughts and questions on the subjects’ minds. Such an “imagina-
tion of alternatives to reality is called counterfactual thinking” (Markman et al. 
1993, 88). A different future was so close at hand that there is no way but to 
contemplate this alternative. It seems that this closeness somehow highlighted 
the existence of an open future, of other possibilities, of contingency, when 
usually we tend to assess the status quo as given, as the necessary and only 
possible outcome of a situation. 
The psychologist Neal Roese emphasizes the role of closeness as an activa-
tor of counterfactual thinking. He says that in particular downward counterfac-
tuals (i.e. when the imagined alternative is worse than the actual situation) are 
rarely activated spontaneously and usually require a trigger. Outcome closeness 
can be such a trigger (Roese 1997, 136-7). Roese also refers to the classic (and 
in this case fictional) example of a missed and later crashed plane. In addition, 
however, he cites a study that tested the role of closeness in counterfactual 
thought activation. In the fictional scenario, a man had forgotten to submit his 
insurance policy either three days or six months before a fire broke out. In a 
subsequent thought listing1, counterfactual thoughts about (not) submitting the 
policy appeared more frequently in the closer scenario in which three days had 
made the crucial difference (Roese 1997, 137). 
In both examples closeness (together with the seriousness of the situation) 
clearly is the principal activator of counterfactual thinking. Its purpose, how-
ever, differs widely. Once could assume that there is no use crying over spilt 
milk in the fictional example. The man was not insured and the insurance com-
pany, therefore, will not carry the costs caused by the fire. However, as a direct 
action (or inaction) of the thinker has actually brought about the unfavourable 
situation (not the fire but the financial loss), thinking about counterfactual 
scenarios can highlight causal relations in this case. If the protagonist had been 
more diligent and submitted the insurance policy earlier, the insurance com-
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pany would now cover the damage. To the counterfactual thinker a clear causal 
relation between his action (or inaction) and the present situation becomes 
visible. For the future this opens the prospect of acting differently next time, of 
learning from past blunders. Neal Roese has called this the causal inference 
effect. With the help of counterfactual thought experiments, alternative actions 
and outcomes are simulated, causal relations can be established and, eventu-
ally, behavioural patterns can be adjusted (Roese 1997, 141). 
In the non-fictional example, no conscious action of the protagonists was 
involved in avoiding the situation and, therefore, counterfactual thoughts are 
seemingly pointless. By a sheer stroke of luck, the couple has been saved from 
almost certain death. The plane had not been missed on purpose. There are no 
causal chains involved in the example that could have been altered by con-
scious actions of the protagonists. The sole purpose of the recurring counterfac-
tual thoughts is to contemplate alternatives, other possible futures and, there-
fore, big questions such as the role of fate, predestination, contingency, God or 
such like. And yet, counterfactual thinking can have a very important (if not 
always welcome) effect in such a situation as well. When the thinkers compare 
the actual result or situation with the alternative “what might have been”-result, 
this also leads to a reassessment of the actual situation in the light of the alter-
native outcome. Roese calls this the contrast effect. The realized situation can 
appear worse to the thinker than it actually is, if the counterfactual alternative 
would have been much better. On the other hand, an outcome can seem better 
than it is, if the alternative would have been worse. According to Roese, com-
parisons with upward counterfactuals are much more common than ones with 
downward counterfactuals and, therefore, the contrast effect is rarely beneficial 
for the thinker (Roese 1997, 140-1). The non-fictional example about the 
missed plane might, however, constitute a rare exception in this respect. 
Keeping the contrast effect in mind, we can safely say that a situation de-
rives at least a part of its actual meaning from the alternatives that would have 
been possible at any given time. Therefore, counterfactual thinking is a funda-
mental component of assessing a situation and one’s satisfaction with a particu-
lar outcome. Interestingly, Roese has also demonstrated that there is a strong 
link between the contrast effect and the causal inference effect in counterfac-
tual scenarios with a potential learning curve. Protagonists will usually not feel 
as bad about a situation with an upward counterfactual (e.g. a failed exam), 
when a causal relation (e.g. heed the supervisor’s suggestions) has been dis-
covered that promises better results for the future (Roese 1997, 141, Markman 
et al. 1993). The prospect of learning from one’s mistakes, therefore, seems to 
make a past blunder more acceptable. 
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Counterfactual Thinking as a Scientific Method 
Process, n. […] 8. A continuous and regular action or succession of 
actions occurring or performed in a definite manner, and having a 
particular result or outcome; a sustained operation or series of ope-
rations. (Now the most common use.). (Oxford English Dictionary). 
What we can learn from psychological studies on counterfactual thinking is 
that contrary to popular opinion there seems to be some use in crying over spilt 
milk. Even if this might not be the thinker’s intention, counterfactual thinking 
has clearly measurable effects in everyday life – some of them negative, some 
of them positive. It is subconsciously deployed as an analytical tool to unearth 
causal relations or compare a situation against potential alternatives, when a re-
run of the process is not possible. Researchers in the social sciences and hu-
manities intimately know the problem that their objects of study only rarely 
lend themselves to re-runs and experiments. Therefore, the question arises 
whether there is any chance of intentionally applying similar counterfactual 
methods and strategies in order to examine research questions in a scientific 
context. After all the general purposes of analytical thinking in everyday life 
and in the social sciences and humanities are closely related: to understand 
processes and to create meaning. As a matter of course, complex processes can 
only be understood with a secure grasp of the causal relations within. Similarly 
a situation or action can only have a clear meaning in contrast to other potential 
courses of action. Therefore, these are two fields in which counterfactual meth-
ods can be very valuable from an analytical perspective. 
There are, however, at least two more potentially beneficial effects that 
counterfactual thinking can have in an analytical context. While I acknowledge 
that both might seem somewhat trivial at first glance, I am convinced that their 
potential – and, indeed, their necessity – can hardly be overestimated. First, 
counterfactual thoughts can help researchers to overcome traditional, estab-
lished boundaries and pathways of enquiry. They can allow us to zoom out, re-
focus and contemplate a fresh perspective, when in danger of becoming profes-
sionally blinkered. And second, counterfactual thinking can be very informa-
tive regarding the thinker’s very own positions and viewpoints. It can be a 
means to create self-awareness in researchers regarding their own perspectives 
and potential biases. Taken together I see four main areas – causation, contrast, 
Spielraum and self-awareness – to which counterfactual thinking can make 
worthwhile contributions in an academic setting. In the following, I will briefly 
elaborate on these four areas from a more general viewpoint before then using 
counterfactual history as a concrete example from the disciplines. 
Causation 
The search for causal relations lies at the very heart of modern scientific en-
quiry and unites the most diverse disciplines – from the natural sciences via 
 31
medicine to the social sciences and the humanities. Most research in all these 
fields is concerned with the analysis and eventually with the understanding of 
processes of some sort. While, of course, the object of study itself will be static 
or unchanging in many cases, it will usually be part of a larger process. Under-
standing the status of the object requires understanding its position in the proc-
ess in question – its preconditions and its consequences, its predecessors and its 
successors. Indentifying and eventually understanding causal relations is abso-
lutely indispensable in this regard. While united by the search for causation, the 
different disciplines have devised and perfected very different methods to con-
duct their studies. In the classic natural sciences – such as physics or chemistry 
– the controlled experiment provides the principal tool to test hypotheses and 
identify causal relations. In the process or system under scrutiny individual 
factors will be changed by the researcher. By comparing the subsequent results 
in the original system and in the manipulated system, causal factors and chains 
can be isolated. Depending on the researcher’s prior knowledge about the ob-
ject of study, controlled experiments can range from very informed and precise 
enquiries to painstaking trial-and-error endeavours. Eventually, when a series 
of experiments has generated a large enough data basis, extrapolations from 
these data can be made. Scientific theories and laws can be devised from the 
data and will later then be tested further, refined, adjusted and someday maybe 
invalidated. 
In the social sciences and especially in the humanities many objects of study 
do not lend themselves to being examined in controlled experiments. While 
there are certainly research questions – for instance in sociology or communi-
cation studies – that can be answered with the help of controlled experiments, 
this path is barred for other disciplines such as history, literature, philosophy, 
law, cultural studies and even economics to name but a few. Here, the objects 
of study cannot (or should not) be willingly manipulated. Experimental re-runs 
are either impossible or would not produce usefully results – or both. For in-
stance, a historical event cannot be re-run under controlled conditions, an 
widely circulated piece of literature cannot be unwritten or taken out of circula-
tion, the grammar of a widely-spoken language cannot be changed on purpose 
and existing (and functioning) law should not be altered without exactly know-
ing one’s trade. Therefore, these disciplines have developed a different set of 
methods that usually rests on the careful observation of the object of study in as 
many different settings as possible – without, however, intentionally manipu-
lating individual factors. 
Causal relations are established by diligently observing the course and ra-
tionale of particular processes from different perspectives and with different 
tools and methods. While there usually is no explicit control group (like it 
would be the case in controlled experiments), the research process implicitly 
contains a control element – counterfactual assumptions about the object of 
study. This is to say that every interpretation of the observed data automatically 
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implies a counterfactual element. In most cases, investigators in the social 
sciences and humanities lack the particular form of “hard” evidence that much 
research in the natural sciences rests on. Their evidence comes from diligent 
observation and interpretation – an attempt to make sense of the different fac-
tors and relations in a particular process without having controlled access to it. 
In the investigator’s mind, such interpretation always automatically includes a 
hypothetical scenario in which a factor, indeed, is manipulated. Even if the 
contemplation of such hypothetical counterfactual scenarios is rarely explicitly 
acknowledged, it is part and parcel of the research process. 
To provide a very simple example, let us assume that we want to understand 
why student X failed the history exam. In order to do so we have to place the 
event of failing the exam in a wider process that led to the event (likewise we 
should also look at the consequences which in this particular example, how-
ever, are not of interest to us). Why did student X fail? One possible explana-
tion could be that he/she did not learn enough. But there could be other causes 
as well: maybe the exam was too hard or even unfair; maybe student X had a 
headache and could not concentrate; or any other reason one can think of. Ob-
viously we cannot re-run the process under controlled conditions. We do not 
have the option of conducting a controlled experiment in order to establish 
clear causality in this case. We will, therefore, carefully observe and analyse 
the process of failing the exam, we will compare it with other failed exams and 
then also compare it to passed exams until some causal pattern becomes visi-
ble. Let us assume that the pattern, indeed, directs us to the hypothesis that 
students who learn diligently pass exams and others usually do not. We will 
then – often unconsciously test this hypothesis by asking ourselves what would 
have happened if student X had actually learned diligently. We will re-run the 
process under scrutiny in our minds in order to create a control group. “Thus, 
running a counterfactual simulation in one’s head constitutes a proxy experi-
ment” (Roese 1997, 141).  
To my understanding of analytical processes such counterfactual re-runs are 
an omnipresent and indispensable part of our work whenever we try to under-
stand causal relations. The only way to test whether an assumed cause c does 
actually have the effect e is to manipulate c and drop it from the equation – 
even if this can only be done in our minds. I am convinced that such counter-
factual thinking – however implicit and unconscious it may be – forms a cru-
cial part of every enquiry into causality and replaces the controlled experiment. 
Assuming that this is, indeed, correct one critical question immediately arises: 
if we implicitly apply counterfactual thoughts in every analysis, why should we 
need a more explicit acknowledgement thereof? If we are doing it anyway and 
always, what can be gained by becoming more conscious about the counterfac-
tuality of much of our thinking? Or in brief, if we have been doing this success-
fully for ages, why should we now start to think about it explicitly? A first 
answer can already be found in the philosopher David Lewis’ seminal treatise 
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on causation from the year 1973. Lewis names a number of problems that can 
arise when trying to isolate causal relations in a system: “If c belongs to a 
minimal set of conditions jointly sufficient for e, given the laws, then c may 
well be a genuine cause of e. But c might rather be an effect of e: one which 
could not, given the laws and some of the actual circumstances, have occurred 
otherwise than by being caused by e. Or c might be an epiphenomenon of the 
causal history of e: a more or less inefficacious effect of some genuine cause of 
e. Or c might be a preempted potential cause of e: something that did not cause 
e, but that would have done so in the absence of whatever really did cause e” 
(Lewis 1973, 556-7). 
In statistical terms, we could also say that correlation does not imply causa-
tion. In uncontrolled research scenarios, counterfactual thinking can help us to 
avoid confusing correlations with causal relations by hypothetically manipulat-
ing the assumed cause c. While we are, as put forward above, automatically 
applying counterfactual thoughts in such situations, only a deliberate and ex-
plicit adoption of this mode of thinking will allow us to steer clear of the pit-
falls that Lewis identified. Intentional counterfactual thinking can lead us 
deeper into the complexity of a studied system of relations than implicit 
thoughts will be able to. A simple example can be found in an article by Joseph 
Halpern and Judea Pearl who in turn have adapted it from other writers in the 
field. Two fires (A and B) are advancing towards a house. Fire A is a bit faster 
and burns down the house before fire B can do so. Typically, fire A will be 
identified as the “actual cause” for the devastation. This example challenges 
classic counterfactual definitions of causation – such as Lewis’ – as the house 
would have burnt down (due to fire B) even if fire A had been extinguished 
(Halpern and Pearl 2005, 843-4). In research scenarios that are not as deliber-
ately obvious as the example of the two fires, the interpretation of such more 
complicated interrelations of causes and effects are beyond the capacity of 
implicit counterfactual thinking. In the social sciences and humanities, most 
objects of study encompass an often confounding multitude of interrelated 
factors that, indeed, invites misinterpretation along the lines sketched out by 
Lewis in the quotation above. An explicit and interest-guided application of 
counterfactuals in such research scenarios can help investigators to steer clear 
of Lewis’ pitfalls. Or as the political scientist Richard Lebow puts it: “I use 
counterfactuals to probe the limits of theory and to develop better means of 
understanding causation in an open-ended, non-linear highly contingent world” 
(Lebow 2009, 66). 
Contrast 
Both the social sciences and the humanities are not only concerned with under-
standing causal relations and the inner workings of a process, they are equally 
(sometimes even more) interested in understanding the meaning of events, 
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social practices or artefacts – and especially in the creation of such meaning. 
While this focus has been made explicit in the so-called cultural turns of the 
last forty years, it has implicitly informed research interests before as well. The 
social sciences and humanities are primarily concerned with human beings and 
their actions, interactions and products. And these in turn are massively shaped 
by the perceptions, the views, the knowledge of the people (or groups of peo-
ple) under scrutiny. A historical event or a social practice, for instance, might 
well be objectively described by the historian or the ethnologist, but a good part 
of its power, of its meaning depends not on how it actually took place (in a 
Rankean sense) but rather on how it is perceived, interpreted and remembered 
by the people. 
As mentioned above, the closeness of an avoided (or missed) alternative is 
an essential activator of counterfactual thoughts in everyday life situations 
(Roese 1997, 140-1). Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that similar 
mechanisms have to be expected whenever alternative outcomes in a scenario 
under scientific scrutiny have – at one point – been very close at hand. The 
researcher will need to take into account that in his/her process of study the 
protagonists’ opinions and actions might be influenced by their knowledge and 
assessment of potential alternatives. This is especially important in all those 
disciplines that are concerned with the actual perceptions and actions of people 
– for instance in history, ethnology, law, sociology and many more. Let me 
refer to a classic historical example in order to illustrate what I mean. Until its 
final stages, the outcome of the Second World War was largely unpredictable. 
To many contemporaries it even seemed very reasonable to expect an Axis 
victory for some time as things were not altogether going well for the Allies. 
No matter how specialist historians might in retrospect assess German chances 
to emerge victorious from the war, it can safely be said that for most contempo-
raries the Allied victory was – all in all – a close one that could not have been 
surely expected. Beyond any doubt the closeness of an alternative scenario has 
triggered a lot of counterfactual thoughts revolving around a different outcome 
of the Second World War. The abundance of alternate history novels playing 
with the very possibility stands testimony to this. 
Together with many other factors – for instance the duration, intensity and 
particular fierceness of the war – this perceived closeness of an alternative 
(which, in addition, would have looked very different than the actual outcome) 
impacts on the symbolic character and the historical and cultural meaning of 
the war. The perception of the Allied victory as a historical watershed event 
that shaped the entire course of the remaining century is further increased by 
imagining the alternative. New meanings are ascribed, old meanings are ad-
justed. For the researcher this means that the Second World War and its sym-
bolic meaning across the globe can only be understood, if he/she has a certain 
idea of the alternatives that seemed open (and, indeed, probably) to the pro-
tagonists of the study (be it, for instance, Second World War survivors in a 
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historical study or be it present-day youths in, for instance, a sociological study 
about far-right extremism today). Here, counterfactual thinking and the explicit 
invocation of counterfactual scenarios can help the investigator in identifying 
realistic alternatives and resulting contrasts. Both in the historical and the so-
ciological context – to stick with the examples – the counterfactuals have to be 
such ones that the protagonists of the study held or hold to be reasonably realis-
tic and influential on the further course of history or on the outcome of some 
process. In his opening chapter to Virtual History, Niall Ferguson suggested 
that all historical counterfactuals applied in a scientific context must be ones 
that contemporaries actually contemplated (for which some historical proof 
should exist) (Ferguson 2003, 86). While I do not support this claim in princi-
ple, Ferguson certainly is right as long as counterfactuals are applied to reveal 
contrasts and the creation of meaning. Both the perceptions of, say, Second 
World War survivors and present-day neo-fascists can only be influenced by 
counterfactuals that they themselves view as plausible, even probable, alterna-
tives. Therefore, it must be the first task of the investigator to identify such 
alternatives correctly. Diligently applied, we can then learn more about ascrip-
tions of meanings and symbolic value to certain events and processes. 
‘Spielraum’ 
Both in order to unearth causal relations in a process as well as in order to 
invoke counterfactual contrast to learn more about meanings, the investigator 
will have to follow certain rules in his/her counterfactual analysis. Alternative 
scenarios should not be deployed randomly. Just like with any other scientific 
method, there are important guidelines that need to be adhered. For instance, 
the principles of plausibility and probability of a counterfactual are among the 
most basic ones (Ferguson 2003, 84-6). To achieve one particular effect of 
counterfactual thinking, however, the researcher will have to relax or partially 
suspend some of the rules. I use the German term Spielraum here for lack of an 
adequate word in English. It roughly translates into leeway or elbowroom and 
denotes the existence of room for manoeuvre – in our case for the investigator. 
The German term, however, consists of the verb spielen (to play) and the noun 
Raum (room or space). Literally is means room to play around and try out 
different things and ideas. This allusion to playing and experimenting makes 
the German term a better choice to name the effect. Developing counterfactual 
scenarios in research can constitute an opportunity for the researcher to think 
about a problem in unorthodox ways. Here it is not the immediate goal to gen-
erate new insights and a better understanding of the object of study. If at all, 
this would only come in a second, disconnected step. Rather, thinking about 
counterfactuals allows a researcher to leave the trodden paths of investigation 
and the established ways of enquiry for some time. It can be used to intellectu-
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ally zoom out, playfully interact with the object under scrutiny and create a 
space in which to let one’s mind wander. 
To this end, the rules that guide counterfactual analysis in order to infer cau-
sation and create contrast mostly do not apply. Here, the counterfactual scenar-
ios invoked by the thinker can range from highly plausible to downright ab-
surd, from very probable to completely impossible. The potential of the 
counterfactual does not rest in its closeness to the “real world” but rather in the 
imaginative power it unleashes. Using one’s counterfactual Spielraum can have 
at least two beneficial effects. First, it can simply be entertainment and distrac-
tion in the – not altogether unheard of – case that a study has reached a tempo-
rary dead end. Mostly no usable insights will be generated by such counterfac-
tual thoughts, but their virtue lies in offering fresh (and not always entirely 
serious) perspectives to the researcher and in thereby relaxing the tenseness of 
an investigation that does not seem to make progress. This can be a very wel-
come and necessary contribution. Second, however, letting one’s mind wander 
in such ways might actually produce completely unexpected insights. The 
history of technology, for instance, knows a fair share of important inventions 
that were the unintended results of unorthodox, allegedly erroneous investiga-
tion. Such serendipitous discoveries are also possible in the disciplines that 
concern us here – but due to their very nature they can neither be predicted nor 
expected. More importantly, therefore, new insights will mainly stem from the 
explanatory power that many Spielraum counterfactuals have as well as from 
the philosophical challenge that they can pose. Many classic thought experi-
ments from the realms of physics or philosophy stand testimony to this. For 
instance, think of Erwin Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment involving 
decaying (or not decaying) atoms, a flask of poison and a cat that is not to be 
envied. This artificial and highly counterfactual scenario offered a powerful 
illustration of a key paradox in quantum physics and made some of the prob-
lems of the field better understandable for those not so intimately acquainted 
with quantum theory. And it opened this new field in physics and its wider 
implications to discussion in other disciplines such as philosophy. The so-
called Trolley Problem in ethics can serve as a further example for a counter-
factual thought experiment that opens up a formidable intellectual and ethical 
problem.2 Here the artificial character of the scenario creates a situation that is 
relatively undiluted by external factors and confronts the thinker with a clear-
cut problem and no easy ways out. Schrödinger’s Cat and the Trolley Problem 
both illustrate the explanatory as well as the disturbing potential that counter-
factual Spielraum in the analysis of a scientific problem can generate. 
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As fourth and final benefit of counterfactual thinking in scientific analysis I 
would like to refer to the possibility to learn more about one’s own views and 
potential biases as a researcher. If an investigator re-runs a process in his/her 
mind (and eventually in his/her writing) with a counterfactual point of depar-
ture, the counterfactual course of events in the process will also reveal much of 
his/her views on the object of study. This is especially relevant for the disci-
pline of history and will, therefore, be discussed in some more detail in the 
following section.  
Counterfactual Thinking as a Historical Method 
Every action of theirs that seems to them an act of their own free 
will, is in an historical sense not free at all, but in bondage to the 
whole cause of previous history. (Tolstoy: War and Peace (BK IX, 
ch 1)). 
As briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter our discussion of counterfac-
tual thinking is based on its broad definition as the “imagination of alternatives 
to reality” by Markman et al. (1993, 88). The beautiful thing about this short 
definition is its treatment of counterfactuals as negative functions of reality. On 
the one hand this allows us to precisely identify and describe instances of coun-
terfactual thinking, while on the other hand a postmodern understanding of the 
term “reality” provides for a more flexible and inclusive handling of the con-
cept. There are realities for the past, the present and the future. For the past, at 
least, there might even be a kernel of a common, an objective reality in the 
Rankean sense on which grew a potentially infinite number of perceived and 
constructed realities in the postmodern sense of the word. While past realities 
exist due to the singularity of history, present and future realities emerge from a 
widely shared belief that there is simply no alternative to certain assumed ne-
cessities.3. Even though such present and future realities – that have not yet 
been fixated by becoming history – can only be established by extrapolation, 
the widely shared belief in them grants them quasi-definite status. In other 
words: by looking at past experiences (some of which have been brought about 
on purpose in the form of experimental studies) we try to identify general laws 
– be it in physics, sociology or any other field – that will govern present and 
future processes as well. Therefore, we have always been creating present and 
future realities by looking into past ones. 
Defining counterfactuals as imagined alternatives to reality allows us to in-
clude investigative practices that do not focus on explicitly past events in our 
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the catchy abbreviation T. I. N. A. – there is no alternative. 
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deliberations. Philosophical thought experiments often do not have a clear 
chronology. In most cases, however, they violate commonly accepted laws or 
run counter any reasonable estimates of probability. Similarly, counterfactual 
reasoning in economics mostly does not aim at the past but rather seeks to test 
alternatives to established economic patterns. To provide one further example, 
conspiracy theories can also be treated as counterfactual explanatory models of 
the world. They run counter a widely accepted order of the world, a perceived 
reality, and offer alternative explanations. All these practices in many different 
disciplines qualify as methodical counterfactual thinking and can harvest one or 
more of the potential benefits outlined above by critically exploring their reali-
ties of reference. 
And yet in many practical research situations, counterfactual thinking will 
nevertheless revolve around events in the past, about historical processes and 
situations. This is probably due to the fact that so-called historical realities 
seem easiest to handle. In most of them, at least a skeleton of generally verifi-
able events remains. History fixates a set of facts on which counterfactuals can 
be based. Time cannot be turned back. Not many historians, for instance, will 
deny that, say, the French Revolution really took place. However, what these 
revolutionary events mean, how they tie in with a greater historical context, 
how they were caused and how in turn they impacted on the subsequent course 
of history, is still – and will probably forever be – the matter of discussions and 
differing interpretations. It is, I believe, this particular dichotomy between 
established facts and diverging realities based on the interpretation of these 
facts that renders historical research a primary field for the application of coun-
terfactual thinking. The facts provide a suitable and easily identifiable point of 
application, while the existence of differing and often competing interpretations 
makes the systematic search for causation and meaning in historical processes 
all the more necessary. This tension inherent to all historical enquiry saw to it 
that the discipline became one of the first fields of systematically applied coun-
terfactual thinking. Writing as early as in the first century BCE Livy suggests 
in a famous passage of Ab Urbe Condita that Alexander the Great, had he lived 
longer, would have been defeated by the Romans. This so-called “Alexander 
digression” has often been referred to as the first account of counterfactual 
thinking in historiography (Morello 2002). And it already illustrates one of the 
potential dangers associated with counterfactuals in history – namely that they 
are conceived in a way that supports the ideological position of the author (in 
this case Roman superiority). But before we turn to the dangers of counterfac-
tual history, let us for a while contemplate how the potential benefits of coun-




Identifying causation in historical processes is essential if we want to under-
stand our past at least to a certain extent. It brings a degree of structural and 
chronological order into a field that proves to be highly elusive. This is a nec-
essary step if we want to understand, interpret and discern meaning from the 
past. There would not be much need to intensively study a past in which every-
thing happened without any relation to other events or processes. Nothing 
could be learned. Nothing would have any meaning. Thus, the search for causa-
tion is indispensable – and often very arbitrary at the same time. As pointed 
out, causation establishes a degree of order in the past that allows us to work 
with our subject, but it also inflicts an order that often reflects more the re-
searchers’ necessities and beliefs than the actual historical pattern of causal 
relations. Causation can easily be ascribed to or read into something. Identify-
ing causal links is, therefore, both a key trade of the historian as well as a deli-
cate endeavour in which the researcher’s own take on history can find a back-
door into the past. 
Counterfactual thinking can be one means to identify and test causal rela-
tions in a process under scrutiny – in history as well as in most other disci-
plines. The approach is well-based on the work of philosophers on causation 
and counterfactual conditionals (for instance, Lewis 1973; Austin 1970; 
Goodman 1947) as well as on psychological studies (already cited above) that 
illustrate how counterfactuals can highlight causal relations. Initially, it works 
along the same principles. In the process under scrutiny, the historian first 
identifies the potential cause – the event or condition whose role in a causal 
chain shall be established. This cause is then counterfactually manipulated – 
just as it is in the philosophical or psychological examples that we have heard 
of. Then, however, counterfactual history begins to differ essentially from 
those examples. While the latter usually aim at establishing a binary causal 
relation between two events or conditions, to the historian cause and conse-
quence cannot be interpreted in isolation and need to be contextualized. In 
practice this means that in counterfactual history we cannot stop with saying 
that without a cause c there would not have been an effect e. In itself, this 
might be a valid and interesting insight. However, unlike many psychological 
test setups or philosophical thought experiments, counterfactual scenarios in 
history are not closed systems. History is an incredibly complex system and 
needs to be treated as such. By manipulating a cause c, not only its relation to 
the effect e is affected – myriad connections to other events or conditions are 
altered as well. These changing relations need to be traced as accurately as 
possible until an alternative timeline unfolds. Only in constructing and arguing 
for such an alternative course of history, the role of cause c can be properly 
assessed. This act of construction compels the historian to think much more 
consciously about direct causal relations between events or conditions than this 
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is necessary in the de-construction of a simple binary causal relation between 
cause c and effect e. 
The complexity of the system and the practically incalculable number of 
possible counterfactual manipulations and subsequent courses of history make 
certain guidelines for best-practice necessary, if the search for causal relations 
through counterfactual thinking should be successful. Niall Ferguson claims 
that counterfactual manipulations should be both plausible and probable. “For 
example, no sensible person wishes to know what would have happened in 
1848 if the entire population of Paris had suddenly sprouted wings, as this is 
not a plausible scenario” (Ferguson 2003, 83). Ferguson then goes even further 
and says that as a general rule “[w]e should consider as plausible or probable 
only those alternatives which we can show on the basis of contemporary evi-
dence that contemporaries actually considered” (Ferguson 2003, 86). This 
would mean that only such counterfactual manipulations should actually be 
made that correspond with scenarios which seemed possible or even likely to 
contemporaries – for which some form of proof must exist. 
Ferguson’s suggestion has many virtues. It considerably narrows down the 
number of alternative paths and it offers an instantly understandable justifica-
tion for counterfactual thinking in history as it starts with an assumption that 
has been contemplated by contemporaries and is, therefore, in a way more 
historical fact than fiction. The plausibility of an alternative scenario is cer-
tainly of the essence, when looking for and testing causal relations. In an im-
plausible alternative (populated with winged Parisians, for instance) the known 
laws, mechanisms and coherences – with the help of which causal relations will 
be tested – might be fundamentally different and simply not conceivable. The 
search for causation needs a plausible alternative scenario governed by the 
same general laws as the real world. That the alternative has seemed probable 
(or even possible) to contemporaries, however, has no impact on causation 
whatsoever and should, therefore, not be considered a general precondition in 
the selection of counterfactuals – even if we will come back to it in a slightly 
altered form regarding the contrast inference potential of historical counterfac-
tuals.  
Focusing on plausible manipulations only narrows down the number of pos-
sible alternatives considerably, but still leaves the investigator with a confound-
ing abundance of possible starting points. The choice between all these possi-
bilities now depends solely on the research interest of the investigator. When a 
starting point – a so-called point of bifurcation – has been chosen and an alter-
native course of history is examined, new points of bifurcation will spring up 
soon. The alternative timeline becomes a “garden of forking paths” (Ferguson 
2003, 68-71) through which the researcher has to negotiate by establishing and 
testing causal relations. As the possible forks and bifurcations increase expo-
nentially with the course of time, in-depth studies of causation are only man-
ageable for short observational periods. Counterfactual history over longer time 
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spans – such as centuries, for instance – can produce feasible and interesting 
results, but will be possible on a somewhat cruder and more superficial level 
only. 
Contrast 
In his groundbreaking book Ungeschehene Geschichte, the German historian 
Alexander Demandt lists three principal objections that have often been raised 
against the validity of counterfactual thought in the historical sciences: the 
meaninglessness of that which has not happened (das Ungeschehene), the lack 
of well-founded research methods and the lack of respect for that which has 
happened (Demandt 1986, 11). As Demandt himself has offered convincing 
counterarguments throughout his book, it is not necessary to evaluate all of 
these objections in greater detail here. The first objection, however, is so fun-
damental that it seems worthwhile to briefly dwell on it. Demandt acknowl-
edges that referring to the meaninglessness of the counterfactual principally 
makes sense. He writes: “Wenn schon ein großer Teil des tatsächlich Gesche-
henen ohne weitreichende Bedeutung geblieben ist, wie soll dann etwas bedeu-
tend sein, das nicht einmal tatsächlich war? Was nicht stattgefunden hat, hatte 
auch keine Ursachen und keine Folgen, die es interessant machen könnten“ 
(Demandt 1986, 11). But later in the book, he seeks to invalidate the objection 
by emphasizing the important role of counterfactuals as contrast and compari-
son. In doing so, however, he actually acknowledges the validity of objection, 
when he writes: “Gewiß bleibt der Einwand richtig, daß das, was nicht stattge-
funden hat, auch keine Bedeutung besitzt. Die nicht eingetretenen Möglichkei-
ten haben selbst keinen Belang, liefern uns aber die notwendige Folie, vor der 
wir die Bedeutung des wirklich Geschehenen erst erkennen. Irrealität ist eben-
sowenig ein Argument für Irrelevanz wie Realität kein Argument für Relevanz 
ist“ (Demandt 1986, 39). While I share Demandt’s conviction that counterfac-
tual scenarios can provide us with a contrast against which the actual meaning 
of a historical event or condition becomes discernable (we will return to this 
below), I would like to emphasise that counterfactual alternatives can – under 
favourable circumstances – have very real consequences as well. 
While speaking mainly about causation, Ferguson already hints at this when 
he writes: “For dice, the past really does not influence the present; all that 
matters are the equations which govern their motion when thrown. But for 
human beings the past often does have an influence. To take a simple example 
(borrowed from game theory): a politician who has shirked military confronta-
tion twice may be emboldened to take up arms the third time he is challenged, 
precisely because of the memory of those humiliations” (Ferguson 2003, 85-6). 
While this example – to my understanding – mainly works through causal 
inference and a subsequent learning process, it nevertheless neatly illustrates 
how das Ungeschehene can, indeed, influence the future course of history – by 
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detouring via the human protagonist and his/her experiences and perceptions. 
In Ferguson’s example, the politician’s judgement of the past will certainly be 
influenced by his/her thoughts about alternative scenarios. Would a different 
course of action in the previous challenges have brought a more agreeable 
outcome? If so, a causal relation has been validated and a lesson learned. But 
unrealized alternatives that seemed likely to happen to a protagonist can influ-
ence decision-taking in a less obvious manner as well. 
On previous pages it has already briefly been outlined how counterfactual 
thinking can invoke an alternative reality that creates a contrast to the factual 
situation. This contrast can influence how someone feels about a situation. It 
can, therefore, alter the perception and meaning of a situation. As Orit Tyko-
cinski and Thane Pittman have shown in a series of controlled psychological 
experiments, counterfactual thoughts can also influence future decisions of the 
thinkers (beyond the learning processes stimulated by the identification of 
causal relations, e.g. in the example of the failed exam) (Tykocinski and 
Pittman 1998). To the thinker, the counterfactual scenario constitutes a possible 
but not realized alternative against which the actual situation is measured. This 
process of measurement and comparison can then alter the protagonist’s feel-
ings as well as actions. Due to the same mechanisms, contrast inference can be 
a very valuable tool for the historian as well. As briefly pointed out above in 
the World War II example, the actions and convictions of historical agents have 
in many situations been shaped by what they themselves have seen as possible 
alternative realities. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any historical studies on 
this particular question on which I could now draw. The following example is, 
therefore, fictional and somewhat constructed. I hope, however, that it can 
illustrate how invoking counterfactual contrast can enhance our understanding 
of the factual course of history in many cases. 
Think, for instance, of a group of people unhappy with the status quo in a 
political entity. Their visions of the past and of possible alternatives to reality 
can become very powerful and influential on their opinions and actions. Their 
counterfactual thoughts about the past can provide a contrast against which the 
status quo is measured. New, additional meaning is ascribed to the factual 
situation courtesy of das Ungeschehene. In many cases this might not have 
direct consequences. In other cases, however, the present situation might be-
come unbearable in the light of missed alternatives. The group might be radi-
calized and stirred into action. In a volatile situation, a counterfactual past 
might have contributed to creating a group of revolutionaries (or terrorists, 
depending on one’s position in the system). Vice-versa revolutionary groups 
might – at least for a time – not thrive in a country that has just avoided a par-
ticularly disagreeable downward counterfactual as the assessment of the cur-
rent situation is measured against the alternative and generally perceived as not 
so bad. This is, of course, a simplistic and constructed example and should by 
no means be accepted at face value in this form. It does, however, illustrate the 
 43
connection between counterfactual contrast and historical action: people act on 
the basis of their perceptions, notions and convictions. They ascribe meaning to 
events and conditions and are in return influenced by such meanings. These 
meanings, in turn, depend to a good part on a contrast with possible (maybe 
even probable) but unrealized alternatives. If the historian wants to go beyond a 
mere description of past events and seeks to understand convictions and moti-
vations, he/she has to trace the counterfactual thoughts of the protagonists. 
For the selection of suitable contrast counterfactuals, Ferguson’s rule re-
garding alternatives “that contemporaries actually considered” (Ferguson 
2003, 86) can be slightly adapted. Ferguson’s contemporaries – from their 
perspective – thought about possible courses of the future before the so-called 
point of bifurcation. If we want to know how unrealized alternatives change 
meanings and perceptions, we will mainly be interested in how historical pro-
tagonists think about past alternatives and which counterfactual courses seemed 
likely to them after the point of bifurcation. It is important to see that in both 
cases the alternatives need not seem likely to the historian, but must have ap-
peared realistic and probable to the historical actors under scrutiny. If this can 
be based on historical evidence, as Ferguson stipulates, the counterfactual 
enquiry stands on a solid footing. 
As illustrated by the two quotes from Demandt’s Ungeschehene Geschichte, 
the invocation of contrast by means of counterfactual thinking can have another 
beneficial effect. While Demandt would reject that unrealized alternatives can 
develop (or trigger) historical agency, he acknowledges their role in providing 
contrast (Demandt 1986, 39). Here, it is the alternative that seems possible or 
relevant to the historian which provides the contrast against which actual de-
velopments are measured. Demandt uses value judgements as his example and 
puts forward that past developments can only be judged in the light of their 
alternatives. “Ein begrüßenswertes Ereignis ist nur dann erfreulich, wenn es 
nicht ein noch wünschenswerteres verdrängt hat. Ein bedauerlicher Vorfall ist 
nur dann schlimm, wenn er nicht das kleinere Übel war und nicht ein größeres 
Unglück verhütet hat. Zu jedem umstrittenen Faktum müssen wir, wenn wir es 
werten, die nächstwahrscheinliche Alternative hinzudenken“ (Demandt 1986, 
25). Demandt mainly refers to moral value judgements, but the same rationale 
can be applied to, for instance, judgements about economic value as well. In 
1964, the future Nobel laureate Robert Fogel published a cliometric study 
called Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric 
History (Fogel 1964). In the first two parts of the book, Fogel contrasts the real 
course of history with a counterfactual timeline in which railroads were not 
available. In comparing the two scenarios, he finds that in many ways the pro-
gressive impact of the railroads has been overestimated and that in a world 
without railroads alternative means of transportation would have led to only a 
slightly lower performance. Fogel uses an explicit counterfactual as well as 
clearly defined cliometric methodology and arrives at an insight that made 
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railroad technology and its economic impact appear in an entirely new light. In 
a less elaborate form, Alexander Field has attempted a similar study of optical 
telegraphy in late eighteenth and nineteenth century France (Field 1994). Only 
the invocation of such contrasting alternatives allows the historian to accurately 
evaluate the meaning and impact of a historical event, condition or – in these 
cases – technology.  
‘Spielraum’ 
Historians look back at the past from where they stand in the present. The 
general course of history is known and always culminates in the present situa-
tion – no matter how fleeting such a culmination might be. While the exact 
mechanisms that brought a particular event or condition about might still be 
unknown, the result itself is more or less out in the open. Knowing about the 
outcomes of a historical process, however, changes the way in which historians 
deal with their subject. Which research questions must be asked? Which factors 
have been decisive, which ones can be disregarded? All this is decided in the 
light of a known outcome, a particular course of history. Thinking about coun-
terfactual scenarios provides an alternative course of events that might lead to 
other questions of which one might not have thought previously or which might 
not even be relevant regarding to the actual course of history – depending on 
the degree of plausibility of the counterfactual. In some cases – especially 
when the alternative is altogether plausible – this practice can open up hitherto 
neglected paths of enquiry which might indeed lead to unexpected insights. In 
this respect, counterfactual thinking can create Spielraum that re-installs a 
degree of outcome-openness in historical enquiry. 
The creation of Spielraum can also have a much more trivial effect, which 
should, however, not be disregarded here. Thinking about counterfactual sce-
narios – be they close and plausible or be they downright absurd – can provide 
welcome distraction from the daily necessities of historical research. As the use 
of the verb spielen suggests, it creates a space to play around and to experiment 
without the pressure of having to produce results – even without having to 
adhere to scientific standards. Even if their immediate scientific output might 
be marginal, such Spielraum counterfactuals can bring playfulness back to 
historical enquiry – a precondition of creativity and innovation that has often 
gone missing in a working environment that is largely governed by the out-
come-orientation of funding bodies and evaluation committees. 
Self-awareness 
Counterfactual thoughts often hold implicit information about the character and 
attitude of the thinker. In everyday life, for instance, different people might 
generate very different counterfactual thoughts (often upward, sometimes 
downward) in the same situation. This can provide clues about the notions and 
 45
maybe even the personality of the thinker – and in historical research, it can 
become a helpful tool to handle a researcher’s presumptions and possible bi-
ases that are always present in his/her work. Individual views about history and 
the forces that govern its course can be very different – among historical pro-
tagonists as well as among historians. They can range from the belief that eve-
rything in history is somehow predetermined to the notion that history is utterly 
chaotic and contingent. Such ideas about the rationale of human history are 
often connected with ideological or religious beliefs or the rejection thereof. 
They are part of our individual Weltbild – our image of the world and its inner 
workings and purpose – and strongly influence our interpretations of past 
events, causal relations and larger mechanisms. This is true for the casually 
interested observer of the past as well as for the professionally trained histo-
rian. For both, it is not possible (and, indeed, not desirable) to be perfectly 
neutral in their assessment and interpretation of the past. Their presumptions 
and their Weltbild will always co-shape their interpretations because they pro-
vide the very theoretical and moral models to which history is constantly com-
pared. The author will always be present in his/her writing (about) history. 
That personal attitudes and beliefs influence the historian’s interpretation of 
history is not a problem in itself, but it needs to be acknowledged. Students, 
colleagues or the readers of a book do not need to share the interpretations of a 
historian, but they should be able to follow their genesis. Therefore, historians 
should be as explicit as possible about their convictions in order to allow for 
maximum transparency. This, however, necessitates that the historian him-
self/herself is aware of his/her implicit attitudes regarding the course of history. 
Here, developing and fleshing out counterfactual alternatives can be a helpful 
tool to locate oneself in the wide spectrum between strict determinism and pure 
contingency. As Niall Ferguson demonstrates, one’s opinion of historical coun-
terfactuals is usually closely related to one’s general view of the laws of history 
(Ferguson 2003). The well-known controversy between Carr and Isaiah Berlin 
illustrates this connection. While Berlin fully acknowledged the role of the 
individual, of agency and accident in history, for Carr, many of the key histori-
cal events of the twentieth century – and especially the Russian Revolution – 
were predetermined and largely inevitable (Carr 1990, Berlin 1997). Accord-
ingly, counterfactual thoughts about an alternative course of history were to 
him a mere “parlour game” without any practical use as such alternatives could 
never have happened anyway. Carr’s dismissive opinion of counterfactual 
history, therefore, already hints at his philosophy of history and helps his read-
ers and students to classify and assess his work. 
Even if Carr had not been as dismissive of counterfactuals and could have 
been persuaded to identify a potential point of bifurcation himself and then 
develop an alternative timeline, the counterfactuals he would have come up 
with would have been very insightful as regards his take on history. Chances 
are that no matter which historical event or person he would have altered or 
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taken out of the story altogether, in his alternative the current of history would 
have returned to its predetermined course quite quickly after this small digres-
sion. While he unfortunately cannot comment on this anymore, it is reasonable 
to assume that Carr would have subordinated individual agency and sheer 
chance (the factors usually manipulated by counterfactual thinking) to bigger 
historical forces steering towards revolution. In his contribution to this volume, 
Richard Lebow shows how many social scientists and historians have similar 
views about the outbreak of World War I. In their views, preventing the assas-
sination of Franz Ferdinand would not have prevented the war as some other 
provocation or incident would certainly have followed and lit Europe like “dry 
kindling” (Lebow 2009, 59). Counterfactuals that return to the real timeline 
after allowing only a small disturbance of the natural course of history hint at a 
philosophy of history featuring at least some degree of determinism and or-
deredness. 
Believers in contingency and a rather chaotic pattern of history will, on the 
whole, be less dismissive of counterfactual history than determinists. And they 
will certainly produce entirely different counterfactual timelines that often 
differ considerably from reality. As such historians usually ascribe much more 
importance to individual agency and chance, counterfactuals will generally be 
more interesting and worthwhile to them. In short, two historians (with differ-
ent notions about the role of determination and contingency in history) will 
usually reach very different results and generate different insights, even if they 
started from the same counterfactual point of bifurcation. No matter how pro-
fessional and objective they are, their different takes on history and its primum 
mobiles will be mirrored in the course of their counterfactuals. To a certain 
extent, their Weltbild will become discernable – both for the reader as well as 
for the researcher himself/herself. In many cases, a historian – if asked whether 
he/she thinks of himself/herself rather as a believer in contingency or determin-
ism – might not even have a ready answer. Possible opinions on this question 
are as multilayered and entangled as history is itself. And while many (or all) 
historians will have some inner opinion or feelings about this, many might not 
have explicitly thought about the problem at all. Here, developing and running 
through counterfactual scenarios in one’s research field can be extraordinarily 
enlightening as the nature of one’s counterfactuals tell as a lot about one’s 
philosophy of history. I believe that thinking counterfactually at least every 
now and then during one’s own research can significantly contribute to a re-
searcher’s degree of self-awareness and, therefore, in the long run to an in-
creased objectivity of one’s work. 
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Dangers of Employing Counterfactual Thinking as a 
Historical Method 
Cold war historiography vividly illustrates how the selection of the 
counterfactual question to be asked generally anticipates the desired 
answer. (Timothy Garton Ash). 
So far, this article has focused on the potential benefits counterfactual think-
ing can have in scientific analysis. Building on findings of recent psychological 
research that illustrate the effects and potential usefulness of counterfactual 
thoughts in everyday life, I have tried to show how similar effects can be in-
voked in a more scientific context in order to produce new insights. Some of 
these uses, for instance the testing of causal relations, have been well-known 
and accepted in many academic disciplines (e.g. philosophy) for quite some 
time. In the historical sciences, however, counterfactual thinking has received a 
lot of criticism and has been largely marginalized. The often-cited opinions of 
E. H. Carr (“parlour game”, “red herring”) and E. P. Thompson (“Geschichts-
wissenschlopf”, “unhistorical shit”) about counterfactual history neatly epito-
mize how the practice has long been eyed suspiciously within the profession. It 
was – and to a certain degree still is – a wide-spread belief among historians 
that history is solely concerned with historical facts, events and processes that 
actually happened in the past. Manipulating such historical instances removes 
them from the domain of history. They are of no interest to the historian any-
more and can, at best, be used to entertain and distract. Counterfactual history 
becomes a “parlour game”. In addition, as we have seen above, counterfactual 
reasoning is particularly hard to reconcile with determinist views on history. In 
combination, such notions about history and the proper subject of the historian 
have for quite some time marginalized (explicit) counterfactual thinking in the 
discipline. 
However, while Carr’s and Thompson’s contributions to the field have been 
invaluable, the discipline has evolved quite quickly ever since and incorporated 
new ideas popularized by the so-called cultural turns. The Rankean search for 
“how it actually was” has since been extended. Historians today look at con-
structions of history, cultural representations or invented traditions just as much 
as they are interested in the Rankean ideal. Roughly at the same time (but rela-
tively unconnected from the cultural turns) historians such as Alexander De-
mandt (Demandt 1986) in Germany or Niall Ferguson (Ferguson 2003) in the 
English-speaking world have published powerful pleas for counterfactual 
thinking in history. Largely thanks to these individual efforts combined with a 
general paradigm shift in the historical sciences, counterfactual history has lost 
much of the stigma of being unscientific that had previously been attached to it. 
And yet, some uneasiness remains – both on the side of practitioners and criti-
cal observers. This uneasiness stems, so I believe, from the various risks that 
counterfactual thinking brings with it and of which practitioners in the field 
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must carefully steer clear. Unlike traditional historical enquiry, counterfactual 
history still has no clearly defined instruments or catalogue of methods. Much 
more than its “factual” counterpart, it depends on the integrity and self-
reflection of the researcher who has to choose adequate points of bifurcation 
and build his/her alternative timeline on reproducible and reasonable assump-
tions. While the link between counterfactual history and actual historical 
sources should never be completely severed, the link is obviously weaker than 
in historical standard practice. The researcher, therefore, has more room for 
interpretation and creativity than usual. However, he/she has to be aware of a 
number of pitfalls arising from this freedom that can easily depreciate or ruin 
the scientific value of a counterfactual study. 
Here, only three potentially detrimental effects associated with counterfac-
tual thinking in historical enquiry shall be discussed briefly: hindsight bias, 
judgments of blame as well as group- and self-protective biases. In psychologi-
cal research, these are well-known and have been studied thoroughly for every-
day-life situations, but they can appear as unintended by-products of counter-
factual thinking in history as well and seriously distort the validity of research 
outcomes in the field. In the extreme, these biases can – consciously or uncon-
sciously – facilitate and legitimize historical revisionism of dubious ideological 
provenance and scholarly quality. Therefore, both historians and readers alike 
should be aware of these effects in order to avoid or respectively detect them in 
historical writing. 
Hindsight bias 
Neal Roese explains hindsight bias in an everyday-life context as follows: 
“After the fact, outcomes are often judged to be more certain and predictable 
than their prospect was in foresight” (Roese 1997, 142). While it has generally 
been assumed that counterfactual thinking and its causal inference effect can 
help to cushion hindsight bias, it seems that in many cases the opposite is true 
(Roese 1997, 142; Roese and Olson 1996). In other words, the ex post infer-
ence of causation by counterfactual thinking can also invoke a hindsight bias 
that can make a causal chain seem unavoidable. Roese holds “that there are 
circumstances in which the counterfactual-hindsight relation is positive; that is, 
counterfactual thinking may increase rather than decrease the hindsight bias. 
The key to this argument is that counterfactuals yield causal conclusions that 
explain why an outcome occurred as it did. And explanation breeds certainty” 
(Roese 1997, 142). Further down the page he goes on by saying that several 
experiments found “that manipulations that heightened counterfactual thinking 
also heightened hindsight certainty, but such effects were mediated by causal 
inferences. Thus, only when a counterfactual is phrased as a conditional and 
only when the individual grasps the causal implications of this counterfactual 
conditional does any increase in hindsight magnitude occur. This evidence 
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highlights a key facet of the functional argument, that counterfactuals influence 
causal inferences that may ultimately prove useful, while evoking exaggerated 
(and perhaps self-serving) certainty regarding the predictability of the past. The 
latter bias seems a small price to pay for the former benefit” (Roese 1997, 142). 
In everyday-life situations, an increased sense of the unavoidability of a par-
ticular outcome might indeed be a small price to pay, when causal inference at 
the same time helps the thinker to learn from the causal chain and its ultimate 
outcome. Historians, however, are primarily concerned with interpreting his-
torical events in a larger socio-cultural framework and try to make sense of 
(and give sense to) past events and processes. Here, hindsight bias – no matter 
if it has been caused or amplified by counterfactual thinking or not – can seri-
ously distort the validity of historical research. Historical events and causal 
chains might seem much more predictable and unavoidable to the researcher 
than they actually were at the time – or than they appeared to be to contempo-
raries. This has implications for the valuation of historical events and actors 
and their role in history. And it also influences the discussion about the respec-
tive roles of contingency and determinism – and, therefore, ultimately about the 
philosophy of history. It is important to note that hindsight bias originates 
mainly from projecting ex post knowledge about the course of history into the 
past. It is not a prerogative of counterfactual history and can be found in tradi-
tional history as well. Practitioners of counterfactual thinking should, however, 
be aware that the practice can under circumstances enhance hindsight bias – 
and to the historian this is certainly not an acceptable price to pay. 
Judgments of blame 
Similar caution is necessary in order to avoid biases in judgments of blame. 
Unearthing causal relations and thereby identifying the principal cause of a 
disagreeable chain of events can lead to blaming someone or something for 
what has happened. Causal inference through counterfactual thinking, however, 
can induce irrational judgments of blame that identify abnormal behaviour in a 
particular situation as the principal cause of events. The classic example re-
volves around a jogger who is mugged while running a route he rarely takes. 
“[O]bservers are likely to think that, if he had stuck to his usual route, he would 
have avoided being mugged. Observers may also note the causal link between 
[the jogger’s] route choice and his victimization and blame [the jogger] for his 
misfortune” (Roese 1997, 142). Irrational attributions of blame do not necessar-
ily need counterfactuals but rather thrive on erroneous causal links. And these 
in turn can be produced by the causal inference effect of badly-devised or ill-
selected counterfactuals devoid of any analytical quality. 
In historical research, blame – in the very sense of the word – should be 
dealt out sparsely, if at all. While historians naturally do have personal opinions 
and positions that influence their work and often shine through in their writing, 
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it is their business to objectively analyse rather than to blame (or applaud) 
someone for having done something. However, the same mechanisms that 
provoke biased judgments of blame in everyday life, can distort historical re-
search results as well. Historical agency might be ascribed to someone or 
something just on basis of his/her/its unusual, unconscious or unintended be-
haviour. According to chaos theory, a butterfly can cause a whirlwind – and 
still the butterfly has no agency in the historical-philosophical sense regarding 
the creation of the whirlwind. Agency depends on the capacity to make 
choices. While it is a conscious choice to flap one’s wings, the connection 
between the two events is so contingent that there can be no conscious agency 
in this respect. The butterfly displays agency as regards flying or moving for-
ward, but not as regards causing a whirlwind. A counterfactual test, however, 
would reveal a clear causal link and possibly identify agency where there is 
none. Other factors necessary for the whirlwind to emerge are overlooked. 
What about the general atmospheric conditions? What about the plane that 
caused minor turbulences in the air that were later enhanced by the butterfly 
flap? Without these and many other factors in place, the butterfly effect could 
not have unfolded. While it is the unusualness of the jogger’s behaviour that 
provokes judgments of blame, it is the triviality of the butterfly flap that tempts 
us to ascribe disproportionately high meaning to the actions (the agency) of the 
butterfly. Both biased ascriptions are the products of causal links inferred by 
ill-selected counterfactuals. While the Spielraum benefit of a counterfactual 
scenario without butterflies certainly exists, its analytical potential is limited 
and distracts us from focusing on other causes. In historical research, this can 
lead to overemphasising trivialities and attributing to them a degree of agency 
that they often do not have or that can only unfold on the basis of other under-
lying preconditions.  
Group- and self-protective biases 
In a recent psychological study on group- and self-protection in counterfactual 
thoughts, Sean McCrea writes that “[i]ndividuals tend to attribute their own 
success to internal causes but their failure to external causes, whereas this 
pattern is not observed for the outcomes of others” (McCrea 2007, 1257). In 
two unconnected experiments McCrea then goes on to demonstrate that such 
self-protective thinking can also be seen in the production of upward counter-
factuals after a disagreeable outcome. In the first experiment, test persons have 
been asked to list counterfactual thoughts about a negative outcome that had 
either happened to them or to a dissimilar other person. “Individuals demon-
strated a self-protective bias by generating more internal than external disad-
vantageous counterfactual thoughts for the dissimilar other but not for the self” 
(McCrea 2007, 1263). In other words, the test persons’ counterfactuals laid the 
blame for the failure significantly more often on the acting person when this 
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person was a dissimilar, unknown other than when they themselves were the 
acting person. The test persons protected themselves in their counterfactuals. 
The second experiment reproduced this result and extended it to the protection 
of a group that the test persons strongly identified with. In the counterfactuals 
listed by the probands, failure of their identification group was significantly 
less often attributed to internal factors than a similar failure of a group with 
which they did not identify (McCrea 2007, 1267). This illustrates that the na-
ture of the counterfactual thoughts produced in a particular situation can differ 
largely depending on the thinker’s affections and feelings towards the situation 
itself but especially towards the acting groups or individuals. In historical re-
search, such a group- or self-protective bias can potentially influence the selec-
tion of counterfactuals as well as the nature and course of the alternative time-
line. Historians are by no means free of identifying themselves with certain 
ideologies, social or economic movements, parties or other historical and pre-
sent groups. This can, of course, lead to unintended and unconscious partiality 
in their research – no matter if counterfactual methods are employed or not. In 
counterfactual historical research, however, such partiality might be harder to 
detect as the actual research is further away from the historical sources and 
depends even more on the interpretations and views of the researcher. The 
famous quote from Timothy Garton Ash that opens this section illustrates the 
potential danger. Practitioners and readers alike should, therefore, be aware of 
the potential effects of group- and self-protective biases which can subtly influ-
ence a researcher’s counterfactual choices. 
Conclusion 
Obwohl nun das physische und moralische Übel nicht notwendig 
sind, so genügt ihre Möglichkeit auf Grund der ewigen Wahrheiten. 
Und da diese ungeheure Region der Wahrheiten alle Möglichkeiten 
umschließt, so muß es unendlich viele mögliche Welten geben, muß 
das Übel in mehrere von ihnen Eingang finden, und muss die beste 
von allen Welten es enthalten: hierdurch ist Gott bestimmt worden, 
das Übel zuzulassen. (Gottfried W. Leibniz (1925, 111)). 
One of the most powerful objections against counterfactual reasoning in his-
torical research has been discussed by Alexander Demandt – as advocatus 
diaboli – in Ungeschehene Geschichte. Thinking about what might have been 
in history is inappropriate because it breaks the connection between the past 
and the present. Demandt writes: “Ändern wir den Kurs der Geschichte an 
irgendeinem Punkt, dann erreicht sie niemals den Ort, wo sie sich heute befin-
det. Mit der Folgezeit verwandelt sich auch unsere Gegenwart, unser persönli-
ches Leben. Eine andere Geschichte, wie sie auch hätte stattfinden können, 
wäre jedenfalls nicht mehr unsere Geschichte, nämlich die, deren Produkt wir 
sind. Hier kommen wir aus dem Akzidentiellen rasch ins Existenzielle. […] 
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Sobald wir die historischen Voraussetzungen unserer Urteilskategorien im 
Gedanken beiseitesetzen, heben wir unsere geistige Existenz auf“ (Demandt 
1986, 13). This is, indeed, a powerful argument. All our interpretations of the 
past – all our attempts to inflict meaning on past events and processes – can 
only be made from our current perspective. Our own history and experiences 
determine the questions we ask and the topics we select. Or as Rosalind Wil-
liams, adapting a metaphor by Peter Galison, states: “History itself is a trading 
zone between past and present. History establishes communication between 
storytellers and actors, between what happened and what is remembered, be-
tween the dead and the living” (Williams 2005, 435). Counterfactually manipu-
lating history, therefore, changes the past as much as it changes the present. An 
interpretation of the past from our current viewpoint becomes impossible as the 
altered past requires a different viewpoint – which we do not and can never 
know let alone take.  
Does this well-delivered objection negate all that has been brought forward 
to support counterfactual thinking as a tool for historical enquiry? What can we 
hold against this argument, when it invalidates the very perspective of counter-
factual interpretation? I believe that there is only one thing that we can bring up 
in defense: namely that the practice should be taken seriously, while at the 
same time not taking itself too seriously. Counterfactual history should not 
claim to interpret a counterfactual past along the same rules and guidelines that 
apply to traditional history. Practitioners must acknowledge that they operate 
on an incomplete knowledge basis that is even more fragmentary and based on 
assumption and extrapolation than traditional history already is. We must em-
brace the fact that our alternate timelines lack a suitable viewpoint for interpre-
tation – and that, therefore, the results of counterfactual reasoning in historical 
enquiry will always be complementary to other insights. Counterfactual history 
can offer valuable contrasts and a laboratory to test hypotheses and causal 
links, but its findings will only make sense in the light and within the frame-
work of traditional historical research. 
Because it would be utterly disappointing to finish an article in support of 
counterfactual thinking with such a comment on the limitations and comple-
mentary character of the practice, let me end by reminding the reader of Niall 
Ferguson’s notion that historical counterfactuals should primarily be concerned 
with alternatives that seemed possible and plausible at the time and were actu-
ally contemplated by contemporaries (Ferguson 2003, 86). While separating 
the past and the present like any other alternative timeline, such counterfactuals 
can complement traditional historical enquiry by bringing the perspective of the 
contemporaries back to life – with all its possibilities, insecurities and open 
choices. And in doing so, counterfactual history responds to the demand that 
one of its staunchest critics has voiced in his most influential work – E. P. 
Thompson in The Making of the English Working Class. In the preface, 
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Thompson states that he is aware of “writing against the weight of prevailing 
orthodoxies” in his book. And he goes on to say that, among others, 
[t]here is the ‘Pilgrim’s Progress’ orthodoxy, in which the period is ransacked 
for forerunners – pioneers of the Welfare State, progenitors of a Socialist 
Commonwealth or (more recently) early exemplars of rational industrial rela-
tions. […] My quarrel with [this orthodoxy] is that it reads history in the light 
of subsequent preoccupations, and not as in fact it occurred. Only the success-
ful (in the sense of those whose aspirations anticipated subsequent evolution) 
are remembered. The blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers themselves 
are forgotten. […] I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite 
cropper, the ‘obsolete’ handloom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan, and even the 
deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of 
posterity. Their crafts and traditions may have been dying. Their hostility to 
the new industrialism may have been backward-looking. Their communitarian 
ideals may have been fantasies. Their insurrectionary conspiracies may have 
been foolhardy. But they lived through these times of acute social disturbance, 
and we did not. Their aspirations were valid in terms of their own experience; 
and if they were casualties of history, they remain, condemned in their own li-
ves, as casualties. […] Our only criterion of judgment should not be whether 
or not a man’s actions are justified in the light of subsequent evolution. After 
all, we are not at the end of social evolution ourselves” (Thompson 1972, 12-
3). 
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